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Competition of Competition Laws
Karl M. Meessen*
I. THE COMPETITION PARADIGM
The situation is succinctly described by Professor Rahl.1 There are
indeed inconsistencies in competition policy, law, and enforcement. One
cartel, tolerated or even endorsed by the exporting state, may fall subject
to the verdict of the competition law of the importing state. States do not
seem to remember that they adopted the resolution containing the Code
on Restrictive Business Practices ("RBP Code") by way of consensus,
thereby pledging to take "appropriate action" against restrictive business
practices "adversely affecting international trade, particularly that of de-
veloping countries ...."I
The Rahl problem makes present policies look parochial and out of
step with the general trend toward globalization of markets. A grand
design for international action seems to impose itself. However, instead
of once again listing the numerous reasons calling for harmonization or
at least joint or mutual enforcement of competition laws, this Article fo-
cuses on the limits of such strategies and ventures to find some merits in
the situation as it now exists.
If there were no divergence of competition laws and related laws of
economic and social policy, there could be no "competition of competi-
tion laws." Competition seems to be for business only. When lawyers
* Professor of Public Law, International Law, European Law, and International Economic Law
at the University of Augsburg, Federal Republic of Germany; Professor of International Trade Law
at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland.
I This Article is dedicated to Professor James Rahl on the occasion of his 70th birthday. The
author gratefully remembers the guidance provided by Professor Rahl's book, COMMON MARKET
AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST (1970), on which he relied in preparing V6LKERRECHTLICHE GRUND-
STZE DES INTERNATIONALEN KARTELLRECHTS (1975).
2 Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices, G.A. Res. 335/63, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 61c) at 223, § C(i)l [hereinafter RBP
Code]. The identical text also appears in 19 I.L.M. 813 (1980).
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turn to discussing competition law itself, they purport to know what is
best, and they will not leave its development to the discovery process of a
competition of competition laws. Yet they should. This Article argues
that competition laws are just like cars in that they improve through
competition. States producing competition laws eagerly compare the
performance of their own laws with those of other states. The present
bandwagon-type proliferation of free market elements in state economic
policies is not due to superior academic argument. Instead, it is due to
the actual performance of market economies in North America, Western
Europe, and above all, in the Far East.
Worldwide uniformity, or harmonization approaching uniformity,
would have its costs. Those costs, as will be explained in Section II,
suggest that harmonization should not be carried too far. Section III
argues that concepts of joint or mutual enforcement would soon reach
inherent limits. Therefore, one is left with the task of coping with the
problems resulting from a diversity of competition laws and enforcement
policies.
The challenge of extraterritorial application of competition laws,
and the response thereto in the form of adoption and occasional enforce-
ment of blocking and claw-back statutes, produce the all-too-familiar
conflicts of jurisdiction. To perceive these measures as a competition of
competition laws helps in understanding the role international law must
play. Section IV discusses the various principles and rules of interna-
tional law in light of the Wood Pulp decision by the European Court of
Justice,3 the 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Draft Guidelines issued by the
U.S. Department of Justice ("1988 Draft Guidelines"),4 and the recently
terminated Minorco takeover litigation.5
II. RISKS OF OVEREXTENDING HARMONIZATION
In Europe, supranational competition law is gradually replacing na-
tional laws. Moreover, in the world at large, states are undertaking com-
mitments to pursue similar competition policies, and they are taking
parallel action to introduce and strengthen elements of the market econ-
omy. Yet differences in competition laws persist. Conflicts among those
3 A. Ahlstr6m Osakeyhti6 v. Commision, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1 14,491 (Sept. 27, 1988)[hereinafter Wood Pulp].
4 Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 53
Fed. Reg. 21,584 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Draft Guidelines].
5 Consolidated Gold Fields v. Anglo American Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part and remanded, Consolidated Gold Fields v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1989), Consolidated Gold Fields v. Anglo American Corp., 713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),
1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,586 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)[hereinafter Minorco].
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laws, and with related laws of an industrial policy character, continue to
trouble decision-makers in business. The resulting need for accommoda-
tion causes state administrators to fall short of enforcing their intended
policy goals.
To discuss overextension of harmonization may seem premature.
Indeed, today's trend toward harmonization should be commended for a
number of reasons. In the regional setting of European integration, how-
ever, some of the risks which may be associated with carrying harmoni-
zation too far have already begun to surface. What are those risks?
The European Economic Community ("EEC") recently adopted its
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings
("EEC Merger Regulation") 6 on December 21, 1989. This occurred af-
ter more than 16 years had passed from the time the EEC tabled the first
proposal for merger control7 in 1973. The two main issues which kept
civil servants busy and political agreement in suspense during all those
years were the standards of review and their scope of application vis-a-vis
member state law. The same issues are likely to be the subject of further
controversy, and statements made in the Council at the time the EEC
Merger Regulation was adopted may well have a bearing on future dis-
putes. In a most unusual step, those statements will be published in the
Official Journal of the European Community.8
As to the standards of review, the EEC Merger Regulation in its
final form came down in favor of making mergers subject to competition
law criteria only. The question presented is, will the merger "create or
strengthen a dominant position?" The merger regulation draft of No-
vember 30, 1988, still contained what could be understood as an indus-
trial policy exemption.9 Under Article 2(3) of that proposal, mergers
qualified for an exemption if they contributed "to promoting technical or
economic progress." Technical and economic progress are factors for
evaluation with respect to the question whether "effective competition
would be significantly impeded" in the final version of the EEC Merger
Regulation. The deletion of the industrial policy exemption, at first
sight, means victory for competition policy purists. Its price, however, is
to dilute the very standards of competition law by blending them with
industrial policy elements.
6 Council Regulation No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations Be-
tween Undertakings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 395) 1 (1989)[hereinafter EEC Merger Regulation].
7 Proposal for a Regulation (EEC) of the Council on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 92) 1 (1973).
8 EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 6, at n. 7.
9 Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of the Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 22) 14 (1989).
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For the time being, the scope of application of European merger
control is rather narrowly defined. The EEC Merger Regulation is ex-
pected to cover some 50 cases per year in a market of 320 million peo-
ple."° All other mergers continue to be subject to Member State merger
control as it exists in some Member States and not in others. In addition,
the Commission is given discretion to refer to a Member State authority
those mergers of a "community dimension" where the relevant market in
that Member State "presents all the characteristics of a distinct mar-
ket."'" Finally, Member States retain concurrent jurisdiction in cases of
a community dimension to pursue their "legitimate interests" outside
competition law, such as public security, plurality of the media, and pru-
dential rules. 12
European merger control demonstrates in the first place how diffi-
cult it is to single out competition as a subject matter of its own and
separate it from bordering industrial policy considerations and other less
related matters, such as national defense and freedom of the press. In
other words, any move toward more harmonization of competition laws
also affects a number of other areas of state activity. The question then
arises whether those activities should be harmonized as well.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") 3 provides
freedom of trade in goods and may soon provide for freedom of trade in
services.14 The resulting globalization of markets, however, is not
matched by any globalization of industrial and distributory policies
which are intended to promote technological progress or compensate ac-
tual or perceived market failures and undesirable effects on income distri-
bution.15 Unless harmonization reaches those policies as well, nation-
states will continue to act individually and inconsistently, and they will
continue to prejudice the policy goals of other states. The national bias
such policies imply often should be deplored as mercantilist and protec-
tionist. Yet total elimination of the bias would require an international
structure quite different from the one that presently exists. This would
approach engaging in some type of world state utopia.
The second, and more indirect, lesson contained in the European
10 Press Release of the Commission of the European Community (Dec. 22, 1989), Memo 77/89,
at 2.
11 EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 6, art. 9.
12 Id., art. 21.
13 General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (effective Jan. 1, 1948)[hereinafter GATT].
14 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Decisions Adopted at the Mid-term Review of the
Uruguay Round, 28 I.L.M. 1023 (1989).
15 For a discussion of the need for such policies, see Ordover, Conflicts of Jurisdiction: Antitrust
and International Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (1987).
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merger control example is that complete harmonization, even in the
wake of the 1992 integration, 6 is neither necessary nor desirable. Most
mergers will continue to be reviewed, or not reviewed as the case may be,
under Member State law. The resulting differences in the legal environ-
ment in the various parts of the European market cannot be ignored.
But it is for business and for the respective state to determine future
merger activity. The "new approach" to harmonization17 is to substitute
supranationally imposed harmonization by a mutual recognition of stan-
dards, which exposes those standards to a competition among
themselves.
Despite shrinking distances and globalization of markets, states re-
main the principal forum for political decision making. Competition
law, with its industrial policy and distribution policy implications, con-
tinues to be a central field for state political action. Overextending har-
monization would make competition law inflexible because agreement on
any change would be slow to reach and unresponsive to economic reality,
and because factual conditions could not be the same throughout an ex-
tensive area. Furthermore, a competition of competition laws will sus-
tain that elements of political choice and personal freedom, which
democratically organized peoples should be anxious to retain.
Business, by making decisions regarding cross-border investment
and disinvestment, indicates success or failure. If harmonized competi-
tion law were to fail on a universal scale, adjustment would still be possi-
ble. A more successful example in a neighboring state may be observed
and imitated. In a way, the competition of competition laws follows the
same succession of innovation and imitation that is the pattern of compe-
tition in business conduct. The best outcome for competition itself can
be expected if harmonization is not carried to an extreme and a lively
competition of competition laws is promoted.
III. LIMITS TO JOINT AND MUTUAL ENFORCEMENT
Harmonization could be replaced, to some extent, by joint or mutual
enforcement of competition laws. Mutual recognition of home state or
country of origin standards in fact moved European integration out of
the blind alley in which harmonization policy found itself in the early
1980s, when Member States were unable to agree on common standards.
Perhaps a similar device of mutual enforcement of competition laws, or a
16 See Meessen, Europe En Route to 1992: The Completion of the Internal Market and its Impact
on Non-Europeans, 23 INTr'L LAW. 359 (1989).
17 See Council Resolution on a New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standards, 28
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 136) 1 (1985).
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more extreme step of immediate joint enforcement of competition laws,
should be employed.
The practice of competition law has seen little joint enforcement.
Joint defensive action is quite common, though. 18 There has never been
a case where the United States, Japan, and the European Communities
("EC"), for example, have joined forces against a particular cartel. At
present, multiple foreign governments could not be plaintiffs in such civil
or criminal proceedings. One might consider changing national law in
that respect, or better still, consider setting up an international law in-
strument of that kind. Is there a need, however, for joint enforcement
along these lines?
Joint enforcement, under present law, could be organized only in the
form of parallel action, with each state proceeding under its own laws to
fight a single set of restrictive practices. Such parallel action was taken in
the IBM case. 9 In that case, the U.S. government and several private
litigants instituted proceedings charging IBM with illegal lead-time prac-
tices. After this litigation had proceeded for several years, the Commis-
sion of the European Communities ("Commission") initiated its own
investigation and filed suit against IBM shortly after Ronald Reagan de-
feated Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential elections. The Reagan ad-
ministration was critical of the duplicative character of the EC
proceedings and, understandably, stepped up its criticism once it
dropped its own civil action against IBM in the beginning of 1982. As of
that time, the EC proceedings ceased to be parallel to the U.S. proceed-
ings. Instead, they had become contradictory to the position then held
by the U.S. government, which also saw its international law objections
reinforced.
The IBM case shows that joint enforcement in the form of parallel
action carries the risk that enforcement policies later will float apart.
Parallel action seems justified where each state has a valid case of its own
which could be continued independently if one state drops out of the
litigation. As a device for mutual support, parallel enforcement is not
warranted. The remedies of one state usually suffice. Enterprises have
property interests spread all over the world and thus are subject every-
where to the execution of fines, penalties, and other monetary awards
18 For examples of cases where foreign governments, through diplomatic notes and amicus
briefs, have joined forces to defend their respective nationals against the enforcement of domestic
competition law, see Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 783, 791-94 (1984)[hereinafter Meessen article 1].
19 International Business Machines Corp. v. Commission, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1857, 32
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 93. For later developments, see Legal Times, Jan. 18, 1982, at 29; Wall St. J.,
Mar. 31, 1982, at 1, col. 6; Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
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enforcing competition law, unless they foreclose all intention of ever do-
ing business in a particular state. Fact-finding, of course, presents a seri-
ous problem of enforcement, but that problem need not be solved by
parallel action. Consultations and exchanges of information will suffice,
and indeed such cooperation is standard practice as it has developed
under a series of OECD recommendations.20
Mutual enforcement of competition laws-i.e., one state seeking to
apply and enforce the law of another state-is not popular either. The
RBP Code envisions mutual enforcement when it calls upon states to
fight restrictive business practices whenever they affect international
trade, whether or not anticompetitive effects on the domestic market are
present.2" This call has been ignored, however, as have, until recently, all
suggestions of private international law doctrine to apply the competition
law of a foreign state affected by restrictive business practices, even
where that state's law is not the proper law of the contract.22 An excep-
tion to the rule is Article 137(1) of the Swiss statute on private interna-
tional law, which provides for the application of foreign law in such
circumstances. Article 137(2) of the Swiss statute adds, however, that no
claim for damages could be awarded which would not also be founded
under Swiss law.2 3
Mutual enforcement of competition law, in all its variants, en-
counters a difficulty which does not seem to be present in fields of law
where foreign law is traditionally applied. That difficulty results from
the volatility of competition law itself. Market conditions are always on
the move. An assessment of the factual situation in a particular case
which may have been correct at the outset need not hold true through
the last state of fact-finding. The problem then is how to arrange for
foreign fora to constantly update their findings.
Moreover, in competition law, policy goals and legal instruments
are subject to continuous change. Competition law is political law. It
does not lend itself easily to being applied by the courts of other states.
The application and enforcement of competition law cannot be separated
from policy trends. The IBM case demonstrated this. Even German law
has seen direct government intervention in certain cases. In Germany,
r
20 For the latest version of the OECD Recommendations, see Revised Recommendation of the
Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affect-
ing International Trade,.25 I.L.M. 1629 (1986).
21 RBP Code, supra note 2.
22 See M. MARTINEK, DAs INTERNATIONALE KARTELLPRIVATRECHT (1987).
23 Schweizerisches Bundesblatt 1988, I 5. For an English translation, see P. KARRER & K.
ARNOLD, SWITZERLAND'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW STATUTE OF DECEMBER 18, 1987,
128-29 (1988).
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cartel agreements and merger transactions may be exempted from statu-
tory prohibition, even if confirmed by the courts, through a decision to
that effect by the Federal Minister for Economics.24 The acquisition of
the aircraft producer MBB by the automobile and electronics group
Daimler-Benz/AEG is the most recent example of the occasional exer-
cise of that ministerial authority.
Should Switzerland, under its Article 137, make the outcome of pri-
vate litigation dependent on such foreign government intervention?
Should it guess what shift in enforcement policy will occur when one
U.S. administration is succeeded by another? Enforcement subject to
foreign government instructions does not work. Ignoring the instruc-
tions would be incorrect. To refrain from directly applying foreign com-
petition law seems the only answer. This means, however, that private
parties are left with seeking judicial review of restrictive practices before
the courts of the state upon whose laws they rely. If that proves to be
cumbersome or unfeasible, at least the parties know where they are.
Competition law, as noted above, cannot be separated from its eco-
nomic and social policy context. Therefore, enforcement can be handled
only by the state which produces the law and constantly monitors its
development. Neither joint nor mutual enforcement helps to solve the
problems resulting from the continued diversity of competition laws.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE COMPETITION
OF COMPETITION LAWS
The diversity of competition laws and of their enforcement may pro-
duce conflicting demands for business conduct. In addition, national leg-
islators could shy away from regulating international conduct, thereby
producing a competition law vacuum which allows restrictive business
practices to develop free from state supervision. Both problems are due
to the basic dilemma of international economic law: territorially limited
state power must cope with transnational business operations.25
International law, although the only legal system binding upon all
state decision-makers, has but a limited role in regulating the competi-
tion of competition laws. It is mainly for the competing states them-
selves to delimit the respective spheres of jurisdiction through "mutual
24 German Law on Restraints of Competition, §§ 8, 24(3), BGBl.I 1761 (1980). For an English
translation, see R. MUELLER, M. HEIDENHAIN & H. SCHNEIDER, GERMAN ANTITRUST LAW (3d
ed. 1984).
25 For a general examination of the international law of jurisdiction, see Meessen, Conflicts of
Jurisdiction Under the New Restatement, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1987)[hereinafter Mees-
sen article 2].
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adjustment"26 brought about by national conflict of laws rules. Interna-
tional law comes in only when states deviate from the general pattern of
jurisdictional conduct as developed by a process of mutual adjustment.
That pattern reflects the minimum standard of international law,
whereas it is for national conflicts legislation to seek the optimal solution
from the perspective of the respective state.17
Following the structure of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States ("Restatement"), three principles of inter-
national law on state jurisdiction have emerged: 1) the minimum contacts
principle, 2) the principle of reasonableness, and 3) the principle of bal-
ancing state interests.28
A. Minimum Contacts
Section 402 of the Restatement offers a wide choice of connecting
factors which may be relied upon to establish a basis for state jurisdic-
tion.29 That choice is somewhat narrowed when it comes to vindicating
jurisdiction in a particular field of law, such as competition law. This
subject is stated in § 415 of the Restatementonly as a matter of U.S. law,
implying its conformity with international law.30 The key question dis-
cussed in international law doctrine is whether substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effects on the domestic market would suffice to justify the
application of domestic competition law (the effects principle), or
whether some elements of domestic business conduct would have to be
established (the principle of territoriality).
In the Wood Pulp case, the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities confirmed EC jurisdiction over agreements by Canadian, Finn-
ish, and U.S. producers, which allegedly fixed the price of exports into
the EC.3 1 On the one hand, the Court found the territoriality principle
to be "universally recognized in public international law."' 32 On the
other hand, the Court construed the territoriality principle to refer to the
place of implementation, adding that it would be "immaterial" whether
or not the producers implemented their agreement within the EC by tak-
ing "recourse to subsidiaries, agents, subagents or branches within the
26 For a sociological study of that process, see C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOC-
RACY, DECISION MAKING THROUGH MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT (1965).
27 See Meessen article 1, supra note 18, at 789-90, 801-02.
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402-403
(1987)[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
29 Id. § 402.
30 Id. § 415.
31 Wood Pulp, supra note 3.
32 Id.
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Community in order to make their contacts with purchasers within the
Community., 33
If the Wood Pulp court's interpretation of the territoriality principle
is correct, the effects principle must be credited for setting more clearly
defined and narrower standards. Basing jurisdiction on effects on domes-
tic competition has the additional advantage of corresponding to the ra-
tionale for competition law, namely the establishment and protection of a
particular economic system by the state exercising jurisdiction.34 Mean-
while, the whole controversy will have to be reconsidered since all of the
member states of the United Nations have, under the RBP Code, con-
sented to an exercise of antitrust jurisdiction whenever restrictive busi-
ness practices affect international trade, even if it is unrelated to the state
exercising jurisdiction.35 The common denominator of state practice
might turn out to be that states simply follow their enlightened self-
interest, and not any preference for a particular connecting factor.36
B. Reasonableness
The Restatement emphasizes the principle of reasonableness. Ac-
cording to sections 403(1) and 403(2) of the Restatement,37 reasonable-
ness requires a state to consider the exercise of jurisdiction in any given
case under a combination of all conceivable factors, and then suggest to
go ahead, refrain from regulatory action, or find some medium way of
accommodation. A principle this broad can best be operated under na-
tional law, where the constitution and a body of statutory provisions set
up a "reasonable" and predictable framework for arguing
"reasonableness."
What may seem reasonable under the law of one state, however,
need not be considered reasonable under the law of another state. Other-
wise there would be no conflicts of jurisdiction. As a principle of interna-
tional law, reasonableness merely means that in conflicts cases, states
should not satisfy themselves with a single-minded pursuit of their regu-
latory goals, but should exercise restraint by taking into account all perti-
nent factors, such as individual hardship and conflicting interests of
other states.38
Reasonableness is identical to comity under U.S. law. It shares its
33 Id. at 18,612.
34 Cf Puttler, Summary ofA. Ahlstr'm Osakeyhtid v. Commission, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 357, 360
(1989).
35 RBP Code, supra note 2, § E(4).
36 Meessen article 1, supra note 18, at 798-801.
37 RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 403(1) & (2).
38 For an elaboration of this point, see Meessen article 2, supra note 25, at 54-60.
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flexibility where there is no congressional intent to the contrary. If there
is contrary intent, comity or reasonableness is defined by Congress, or
maybe by the President. In its 1988 Draft Guidelines, the Justice De-
partment denies U.S. courts the right to decide on the basis of comity
antitrust suits that are prosecuted by the government. 39 In private litiga-
tion, U.S. courts may and, under the guidance of amicus briefs of the
government, should exercise restraint on the basis of comity. Whether or
not there is an "executive" prerogative of defining comity in such a man-
ner is for U.S. law and its constitutional principles on separation of pow-
ers to determine. International law is not involved. The Restatement's
extensive reliance on the principle of reasonableness should not cloud its
basic weakness under interaional law.
C. Balancing State Interests
The workability of the competition of competition laws is at stake
when one state interferes with another state's application of its competi-
tion law, or with another state's industrial policy priorities. Whether this
type of conflict occurs will vary from case to case. It is possible that the
government of a state affected by a particular practice will not object to
the extraterritorial application of competition law, and a state may in
fact welcome such action where it takes a pro-competition stand as well.
If, however, a conflict arises, then section 403(3) of the Restatement sug-
gests to "defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly
greater."'
The foregoing balancing rule of non-interference differs from the
principle of reasonableness in that it reduces the open-ended multifactor
approach to the weighing of just two factors: the interests of the regulat-
ing state and those of the foreign state affected. The rule is still contro-
versial. The Restatement states it as a non-mandatory rule, using the
language "should defer."41 This author, however, believes it to be a
binding rule of international law. If state practice is considered as a
whole, and diplomatic practice is included, as it should be from the per-
spective of international law, the operation of the rule is evidenced by the
ultimate resolution of many conflicts of antitrust jurisdiction since the
end of World War I.42
The rule is reflected in recent case law as well. In the Wood Pulp
case, the U.S. applicants pleaded an infringement of the international law
39 1988 Draft Guidelines, supra note 4, at 21,594-95.
40 RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, § 403(3).
41 Id.
42 See Meessen article 1, supra note 18 at 802-08; Meessen article 2, supra note 25, at 60-65.
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rule of non-interference, which "prohibits a state from adopting meas-
ures under its national law if those measures have an adverse effect on
the interests of another state and if those interests outweigh its own."4 3
The Court saw no need to inquire into the existence of the principle, but
it also took pains to explain that in this particular case, it was not in-
fringed upon.' The application of EEC competition law indeed did not
prejudice "greater interests" of the United States. The U.S. government,
fully aware that it would have taken a similar attitude had the agree-
ments been aimed at the U.S. market, had declared itself "satisfied with
the results" of the consultations held with the EC Commission.45
In the Minorco litigation, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York effectively blocked a foreign takeover.4 6 Minorco,
a Luxembourg subsidiary of the South African Harry Oppenheimer
group, was to buy the shares of the British company Consolidated Gold
Fields PLC. The majority of Gold Fields' shareholders accepted the bid.
The main link to the United States was the 57% owned U.S. subsidiary
of Gold Fields. The antitrust charge was that the Oppenheimer group
would dominate the gold market and shift production from its future
U.S. subsidiary Newmont to its less profitable but fully owned South Af-
rican companies. The charge was upheld even though Minorco offered
to divest itself of Newmont.4 7
The U.S. antitrust litigation was resented in Britain as yet another
instance of extraterritorial imperialism on the part of the United Staes."
It should be mentioned, however, that the British Takeover Panel
("Panel"), while enjoining Gold Fields itself from continuing the anti-
trust action in the United Staes, did nothing to prevent Newmont from
continuing that lawsuit.4 9
The self-restraint of the Panel may be interpreted as complying with
the general British attitude of refraining from all kinds of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Yet there are other reasons why the Panel may have
stopped halfway, effectively allowing the U.S. Court to frustrate what
essentially was a takeover of a British company by a Luxembourg com-
pany. One reason was that the British company would have been made
43 Wood Pulp, supra note 3.
44Id..
45 Summary of U.S.-EC Consultations on the EC's Proceeding Against Wood Pulp Producers,
quoted in full in View of Current International Antitrust Issues (paper delivered by Charles Stark
before the World Trade Institute (May 20, 1982)).
46 Minorco, supra note 5. See also Lessons of the Minorco Bid, Fin. Times, May 18, 1989, at 14,
col. 1 [hereinafter Lessons].
47 Minorco, 698 F. Supp. at 493.
48 Lessons, supra note 46.
49 Fin. Times, Aug. 8, 1989, at 17, col. 2
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part of a South African group. In fact, Gold Fields was acquired shortly
afterwards by another British firm. The British government, in stark
contrast to its attitude in other cases of jurisdictional conflict, reportedly
did not take any diplomatic steps in defense of the consummation of the
takeover. Though opposed to any kind of extraterritoriality at the ex-
pense of British companies in the abstract, the United Kingdom in this
particular case does not seem to have been entirely unhappy about the
outcome. Reviewing the dispute under the balancing rule, therefore, one
may find that British interests were not impaired.
The balancing rule will be criticized in the future, as it was in the
past, as demanding too much of national courts if they are expected to
accord greater weight to foreign state interests than to domestic interests
under certain circumstances. Yet U.S. courts have an impressive record
in reconciling foreign and domestic interests and thereby establishing ju-
risdictional conflicts as false conflict cases. In cases where a true conflict
exists, national courts indeed are not in a particularly good position to
apply the balancing rule. The rule was produced by ministries of foreign
affairs and, as any other rule of international law, it can be made subject
to adjudication or arbitration by international tribunals. Balancing state
interests is not a task unfamiliar to them.
The balancing rule represents what international law presently has
to offer. It is in line with the basic principle of equality of states. The
competition of competition laws, just like the competition among enter-
prises, can develop only on the basis of equality. Nevertheless, the inter-
national law on the competition of competition laws is open to
improvement, and the instrument for such improvement would be to
convene mulitilateral conventions on the subject. Such conventions
could develop the principles outlined here and, above all, secure their
recognition and enforcement.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The world of competition law is likely to remain an imperfect world.
Harmonization may be desirable, but only up to the point where flexible
adjustment to changing conditions by way of a competition of competi-
tion laws still remains possible. Joint and mutual enforcement can be
introduced only to a limited extent, in view of the constraints resulting
from the economic and social policy context of competition law. The
task, therefore, is to enhance the international law organizing the compe-
tition of competition laws so as to fill the gaps and to deal with the fric-
tions as they arise from time to time. The resulting transaction costs are
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 10:17(1989)
a tolerable price to pay for the benefits of a world-wide competition of
competition laws.
